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Ray P. Cox and R. Morgan IDyreng, its 
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its Sexton, 
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RESPONDENTS BRIEF 
NO. 10,392 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for a Declaratory Judgment in which 
Nelda Crawford seeks to complete a memorial pattern of 
monuments existing in the Manti City Cemetery on ceme-
lery lots owned by her, by establishing pillow type monu-
2 
ments identical with those in the pattern at the h : ead ct 
her deceased husband's grave, as well as the right to have 
an identical one placed at the head of her grave upon h 
d 
. er 
ermse, despite the provisions of an Amended Manti City 
Ordinance requiring that all monuments established afte;. 
its adoption must be flush with the surf ace of the ground 
The trial rourt held that the Amended Ordinance was un. 
reasonable insofar as it prevented the completion of the 
Crawford Memorial Pattern, and enjoined its enforcement 
against the cemetery lots. Defendants appealed from that 
judgment to this court. I 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS l 
With ·the exceptions hereinafter noted we believe that f 
. I 
appellants' staitement of facts fairly reflects the record be- 1 
fore this rourt on this appeal. The exceptions are as fd· 
lows: 
We would mcxllfy statement No 4 on page 5 of ap~I· 
lants' brief to show that the memorial pattern consisted of I 
the three pillow type monuments, and the large monument I 
which was located at the west end of lots. The com· 
plaint alleged, the answer admitted and <the court founa. 
that the Crawford family had arranged and established the 
memorial pattern in the Crawford lots prior to 1915 ana 
there is no evidence in the record to the contrary (R. J.) 
8-9). 
We would supplement paragraph 5 of appellants' state-
ment pertaining to the Edmund Crawford pilloW ~ m~: 
ument and the refusal to allow its installation by the e1cy 
sexton, by setting forth testimony with respect thereto I 
g;.,... at the trial by Beesley as follows: I 
i 
3 
'' l A) Our workmen went down there and erected 
the monument and it was removed. And I went down 
and checked on it and found the sexton had removed 
the base part. We hadn't at that time put the top part 
on." (Tr. 9). 
Beesley's testimony is that the sexton had removed 
the "base part" and this is the only evidence in the record 
concerning the removal. The court found that the sexton 
had "torn" the monument out and we believe Beesley's 
testimony supports it because it is difficult to see how the 
monument base could have been removed without being 
tom out. 
Referring to the last paragraph of Statement No. 5 
on page 6 of appellants' brief, we challenge the statement 
that "since October, 1948, there had been many similar re-
quests by persons whose lots were in exactly the same con-
dition as the Crawford lots." The witness, Hall, testified 
at length that after the amendment of the ordinance in 
question there had been many requests identical with that 
made by the plaintiff in this case and he listed on defend-
ants' Exihibit 8 some eighteen claimed identical cases. On 
cross examination this witness was obliged to admit that 
there were only "Four. Four that I can recall." (Tr. 47). 
There is no evidence in this record CYf an identical case with 
lhe Crawford case because none CYf those mentioned by 
Hall claimed a "Memorial Monument Pattern" established 
long before the amendment in question was adopted by 
Manti City and whieh was sought to be continued and 
brought to a conclusion after the amendment was adopted. 
1Emphasis supplied). 
AµPf>llants summarize the testimony of the witnesses, 
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HWl and Nielsen, apparently for the purpose of showino 
the contents of the record respecting the reasons why Man~ 
City adopted the aemndment in question on October 25 
1948 (App. Br. 7-10). These witnesses gave as the reasoi~ 
why the amendment should be adopted, (1) "to savt 
money for Manti", (2) "convenience for those who cared 
for the cemetery", (Tr. 42-43) and (3) "for esthetic con-
siderations" (Tr. 52). As part of his cross-examination 
the witness Hall said: 
"Q. And the considerations that you had were 
purely from the point of view of the financial interests 
of the city and the convenience of the caretakers? 
A. That is right." (Tr. 43). 
"Q. You didn't consider the sentiment.al feelings 
of people who had established such monuments in the 
center of the block did you? 
A. Yes sir." 
"Q. Well, at any rate you let the financial con· 
siderations pver-rule the feelings of the people? 
A. No. That was not the idea." 
"Q. Well, you did that. 
A. Well-" 
"Q. Didn't you? 
A. To that extent; yes." (Tr. 42). 
On cross-examination Hall testified as to the esthetic 
reasons given by him as follows: 
"Q You did not want to say, did you, that to al· 
• ) · ter· low a pattern established over the years to (be m 'th 
rupted about in its middle would be in accordance WI 
esthetics, do you? . tak· 
A Well I couldn't see that it was addmg or , . ' that wa• 
ing away from the beauty of the stones 
there ... " 
5 
·'Q. Norw I show you Exhibit No. 1. Tua tshows 
the three stones. They look pretty good? 
A. Yes." 
"But you can see by looking at it that it is an es-
thetic blunder, can't you, to disallow the other graves 
to have the same kind of markers? 
A. Well, I won't say that it is a blunder." (Tr. 
54). 
Although the reasons given for the adoption of the 
amendment by Manti City are of questionable relevance 
to the principal issue presented on 1hls appeal, we refer to 
the record in order to show that they are specifically in-
applicable to the Crawford cemetery lots. The witness, 
Hall, testified that Crawfords have always paid their per-
petual care and have maintained same ever since it began 
ln the Manti City Cemetery in 1936 (Tr. 55). Beesley tes-
tified (Tr. 10) "A. By putting a coping, a cement coping 
around the level with the grass out say seven to nine inches 
around each of the markers would give ample room for 
the lawn mower to cut the grass, and with the cement bor-
der around there would beautify and I think would improve 
the looks of the whole area." 
11he witness, Hall, admitted on cross-examination (Tr. 
50) that Beesley's suggestion could eliminate any interfer-
ence with cutting the lawns around the monument. Also 
Hall testified that the reason given for the pa$8.ge of the 
amendment in order to keep the hoses from getting caught 
on the monuments has largely been eliminated since the 
sprinkler systems were installed at the cemetery (Tr. 42). 
We shall hereinafter refer to Nelda Crawford as ~ 
, SJJondent. 
6 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
l 
APPELLANTS' ARGUMENT IS IN PART SEMAN. 
TIC; DOES NOT FULLY SET FORTH THE LAW; AND 
ERRONEOUSLY ATTRIBUTES AS "JUDICIAL LEGIS-
LATION", THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION PROPERLY EX-
ERCISEID BY THE TRIAL COURT. 
We desire to comment briefly on the points made !n 
appellants' argument. 
Point I is largely a question of semantics, appellants 
claiming that the words "tore out the installation" as found 
by the court, is not supported by the testimony of Beesley 
that the "sexton had removed the base part". It is diffi. 
cult to see how the base part of the monwnent could be 
removed without it being torn out, and consequently we 
think the finding is supported. However, the es.5€111tial facts 
in this regard are admitted, i.e., that the monument plain· 
tiff had installed was removed and defendants refused to 
allow it to be constructed because of the amended ordi· 
nance. 
Point 2 (A) and (B) do present the essrotial question 
of law presented on this appeal which we shall answer in 
our argument. 
Apparently appellants felt no need of arguing Point 3· 
Point 4 is not a fair and full statement of the law ap-
. b use it Jacks 
plicable in the situation set forth hereln, eca 
the concluding part of the rule referred to, namely ~al 
• pplica· 
cemetery regulations must be reasonable in their 5.:.--
tion. (Emphasis supplied). 
l 
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Point 5 embodies an untenable argument because the 
trial court did not over-rule the action of the City Council, 
bu it f otmd, concluded, and held that an amendment to • 
an ordinance passed by the City Council was not appli-
cable to the respondents' cemetery lots because it unrea-
sonably denied an existing right of respondent. 
The principal question presented by this appeal in-
volves the validity of the amended ordinance in question 
and the issues in this connection are two-fold: 
(1) Does the amended ordinance in question impair 
the property rights of the respondent by interrupting the 
long established monument pattern in the cemetery lots 
in question Wld.er the guise of regulation? and, 
(2) Is the amended ordinance arbitrary, Wll"e8SQ!l· 
able or capricious as a regulation of respondent's cemetery 
lots in which a monument pattern had long prior thereto 
been established? 
Appellants seem to have correctly understood plain-
tiffs' theory of the case as indicated at the top of page 12 
of their brief, but our argument is not reflected by what 
is there said. The argument is, that the Crawford family 
established monuments in its cemetery lots forming a me-
morial pattern which was 4/6ths complete in 1915, and 
its completion required only the addition of the remaining 
2/6ths of same. This was admitted by the evidence, was 
found by the court and became the basis of the judgment. 
While the monuments large and small themselves oonsis-
tetl of individual stones, yet the memorial pattern which 
they constituted became and remain an entity in and of 
itself even though unfinished. When respondent acquired 
the cemetery lots she succeeded to the rights which had 
8 
vested in the memorial pattern, nearly completed, but then 
unfinished. Appellants must agree with us that the amen. 
ded ordinance in question oould not require respondent to 
remove any of the monuments which constituted the pa\. 
tern in question for the reason that they stood above the 
surf ace of the ground. That being true neither could the 
amended ordinance strike down the memorial pattern made 
up of the monuments. The trial court adopted respond. 
ent's theory and rightly found and determined that the 
amended ordinance could not reasonably prevent the com. 
pletion of the monument pattern. Appellants' reference 
to seven "good men and true" has no relevance to what 
the eourt found under the evidence in this case. The rec· 
ord does not sustain appellants' statement that "there were 
18 additional plots in exactly the same state as the Craw· 
ford lots with respect to monuments and markers installed 
and in contemplation". The fact is that nowhere in this 
record is there any evidence of a situation identical with 
the Crawford lots in that in no other situation was there 
any evidence of the establishment of a "monument me-
morial pattern" which was pursued and in existence long 
before the amended ordinance in question was adopted. 
POINT II 
THE AMENDED ORDINANCE IN QUESTION: 
(a) IMP AIRS THE PROPERTY RIGHTS OF RE· 
SPONDENT BY INTERRUPTING A LONG ESTAB-
LISHED MONUMENT PATI'ERN IN THE CEMETERY 
LOTS IN QUESTION UNDER THE GiUISE OF REGU· 
LATION, AND 
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(b) TifE AMENDED ORDINANCE IS ARBI-
TRARY, UNREASONABLE AND CAPRICIOUS AS A 
REGULATION OF RESPONDENT'S CEMETERY LOTS 
IN \VHICH A MONUMENT PATTERN HAD BEEN 
LONG ESTABLISHED. 
The Findngs, Conclusions and Judgment of the Trial 
Court are preponderantly supported by the evidence in this 
case, and same should be affirmed by this court because 
same are in accordance with law. 
There is no question but that Manti City has the 
powe rconferred on it by statute as a City of ,the third class 
to purchase, operate, and make rules for its cemetery. Sec-
tion 10-8-62, U.C.A. 1953. This we admitted at the trial 
and at no time have be contended otherwise. 
'I'he general rule of law applicable to the instant case 
ls stated in 14 CJS Seeton 3, p. 66, as follows: 
"When expressly so authorized, a municipality may own 
and maintain cemeteries. It may exercise general con-
trol over a cemetery owned by it, but must not ex-
ercise and control t in an arbitrary, unreasonaible, or 
capricious manner." 
It is our position that the amended ordinance (1) un-
reasonably attempts to put an end to the monument pat-
tern in the Crawfod lots, and (2) that the ordinance in 
making such attempt would destroy the vested right of 
respondent in the memorial pattern and would be void and 
of no effect. 
A leading case supporing the foregoing general rule 
and particularly that portion of same which requires the 
exercise of the city's control and regulation of cemeteries 
10 
be reasonably, is Mansker v. City O•f Astoria 100 o 4< ' r. u5, 
198 Pac. 199. The cemetery in that case consis+""1 f u::u o an 
old sectiorn not subject to perpetual maintenance and a new 
section which was being subjected to perpetual maintt-
nance under a regulation known as the endowment plan 
adopted by the Cemetery Commission. When an attempt 
was made to apply this regulation to rspondent's lot In the 
old cemetery it was resisted and this lawsuit resulted. Th~ 
question arose in the case as to whether or not the city 
could force the orwner orf the old cemetery lot purchased 
a long time before the adoption of the new endowment plan 
to pay an assessment in the amount of $77.45 made by thP 
Cemetery Commission against the old cemetery lot owners 
along with the owners of lots in the new cemetery and at 
the same rate. The court discussed the reasonableness of 
the regulation as it applied to the lot ol\VJlers in the new 
secton of the cemetery and held that the regulation was 
reasonable as it affected the owners in the new cemetery, 
then said "but quite a different question is presented when 
we come to consider the authority of the Commission to 
apply the endowmnt plan to lots which were sold before 
the endowment plan was adopted." At page 204 of 198 
Pac. the court further staed that: 
"The concrete question for decision is: Can the Com· 
mission by compulsion bring within the embrace of the 
endowment plan all lots which were sold prior to the 
adoption of the plan?" 
This court considers the nature of the conveyance by~ 
h ·1 even city of a cemetery lot, and also the power oft e ci y, · 
. ht' 
by rthe exercise of its "police power" to abrogate rig " 
Prior tu which have vested by reason of such conveyances 
11 
the regulatory measure. Appellants in their brief argue that 
the conveyance to Crawford carried with it only the right 
of burial and was subject to any changes the city might 
thereafter make, and also that the city had a right under 
ils "police power" to interfere with rights which accrued 
to Crawfords before the amended ordinance in question 
was adopted. The Oregon court in the Mansker case, Supra, 
has resolved these questions against appellants' contentions 
and we quote its language from pages 205-6 of the Pacific 
Reporter: 
"A conveyance of a cemetery lot as a place of burial 
for the dead does not vest :the grantee with fee-simple 
title in the lot ,but gives rights analogous to an ease-
ment or a privilege; the rght of burial being a privi-
lege or license to be enjoyed so long as the place con-
tinues to be a burial ground subject to municipal reg-
ulation and coru-ol and legally revoka:ble whenever the 
public interest requires." 
"The privilege or license created by the conveyance, in 
the absence of express restrictons made at the time, 
include more than the mere naked right of depositing 
a dead body in the ground; for with the right of in-
terment are included :the right to do so according to 
the usual custom in the neighborhood, the right to 
make mounds, and the right to erect stones and mon-
uments at the graves. A cemetery is not only a place 
where the living may bury their dead, but it is also a 
place where they may express their affection and re-
spect for those dead by marking and decorating the 
place of interment." 
"The circumstances are not such as to make the at-
tempted action of the cemetery commission a lawful 
exercise of the police power, broad though the scope 
12 
of the police power is. Nor can the city say that th 
right to compel the application of the endowmen~ 
plan was reserved to the dty at the time of the con. 
veyance of the lot to the plaintiff. The city is with. 
out power to bring the plaintiff's lot within the em. 
brace of the endowment plan, unless the plaintiff con. 
sents." 
"The court on appeal affirmed the decision of the low. 
er court in favor of plaintiff and enjoined perma. 
nently the enforcement of the ordinance." 
The principle of the Mansker case was applied in a 
recent Oregon case, Shaefer v. West Lawn Memorial Cem· 
etery (1960) 222 Or. 241, 352 Pac 2d 744, where it was 
held that the regulation requiring monwnents to be flush 
with the surface of the ground was reasonable as to the 
new section of the cemetery in question but not as to the 
old section. 
At this point we call attention to the Manti City Or· 
dinances, Sections 180 and 181 of the compilation of 1941. 
Before the amendment in question the oJd part of the cem· 
etery, including the part in which the Crawford lots are 
located, was not subjected to the regulation requiring mon· 
uments to be flush with the surface of the ground, but the 
new section was. It was not until the amendment of Oc· 
tober 25, 1948, was adopted that an attempt was made to 
apply this regulation to the old part of the cemetery where 
there existed monuments that were not flush with the 
surface of the ground and which rose above it. In so do-
ing Manti City has attempted to abrogate the vested rights 
of respondent in the said memorial pattm, which had long 
existed in the old cemetery, and the trial court so held ,. 
! 
I 
I 
I 
I 
l 
13 
and its dedsion is supported nort O'llly by the facts but by 
he Jaw which we have hereinabove discussed. 
The above mentioned rule of reasonableness was ap-
plied to attempted regulations by municipalities and the 
attempted regulatory measures were struck down because 
unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and we cite a few 
of the cases as follows: 
Chariton Cemetery Company v. Charlton Granite 
Works, 197 Iowa 403, 197 NW 457, 32 ALR 1401. 
(Rule providing that the work of improving lots and 
the construction foundations for monuments, should 
be done only by employees of the company declared 
unreasonable and void) . 
Rect.or . . . St. Paul's Church, Milwaukee v. Black-
burn (Wis. 1939), 230 Wis. 570, 284 NW 491 (Lot 
purchased without perpetual care-later attempt to 
subject lot to perpetual care held not an exereise of 
police power and ordinance struck down.) 
Scott v. Lakewood Cemet.ery Assoc. (Minn. 1926) 167 
Minn. 223, 208 NW 811 (Rules excluding florists with-
out superintendent permission from cemetery, and 
providing cemetery association exclusively should 
thatch graves at specified presses, held unreasonable 
and void as to lot purchased prior to adoption of 
rules). 
Ignatowski v. St Mary's Polish Catholic Cemetery Co. 
et a.I. (1953 Pa.) 174 Pa. Super. 62, 98 Alantic 2d 234. 
(Regulation requiring interment in concrete vault p~ 
vided by cemetery held unreasonable and void) . 
Steele v. Rosehill Cemetery Co. (Ill. 1938) 370 Ill. 405, 
19 NE 2d 189 (held unreasonable to att:m.pt change 
by rule of cemetery vested rights in cemetery lots pur-
chased prior to amendment raising the price of per-
petual care) . 
14 
Sliver v. Greenmount Cemetery Co. (Pa. 1949) 164 Pa ~uper 534, 67 Atlantic 2d 584 (Unreasonable to sub. 
Ject cemetery lot to perpetual care by ordinance adop. 
ted subsequent to purchase of the lot). 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
It is our position that the respondent has a ves~ 
right to have the pattern of monwnents established and 
carride out prior to the adoption of the Manti Ordinances 
of 1941 and the amendment thereto made in 1948, con· 
tinued and completed so that a like pillow type monument 
could be placed at the head of her deceased husband's 
grave, and provision for an identical monument to be placed 
at the head of her burial place beside that of her hus· 
band. We believe that the law above referred to sustains 
the :respondent's right in the premises, and that the amen· 
ded ordinance in its attempt to abrogate same is unrea· 
sonable in that it would deprive respondent of long estab-
lished vested rights in the premises. The Findings, Con· 
clusions and Judgment holding plaintiff entitled to these 
rights made by the Trial Court is amply sustained by the 
evidence and are in accordance with the law and should 
be affirmed. 
GEORGE S. BALLIF 
For BALLIF & BALLIF 
Attorneys for Respondent 
84 East 100 South 
Provo, Utah 
